HoBo Runtime · Privacy / Messaging
ZITRONE Privacy, with zest.
End-to-end encrypted messaging that disappears. No phone number, no email, no logs, and a server that only ever holds what it can't read.
Android · sideloaded beta. iOS, desktop and web in development.
The basics
Privacy as a property of the design
The server never sees, stores or logs plaintext message content. Not as a policy, but because of how Zitrone is built.
Encrypted before it leaves your hands
Signal Protocol with a fresh key for every message. We store nothing readable, because the design makes it technically impossible.
Read it. Watch it go.
Burn-on-read and timed destruction from 30 seconds to a week. The server deletes each message the moment it's delivered.
Screenshots blocked on Android
Screenshots and screen recordings come out black at the OS level, and every chat carries a faint watermark of your own identity fingerprint.
No number. No email. No name.
Connect by QR code. Your identity is a key pair generated on your device. We don't know who you are.
Burn-on-read
Read it. It's gone.
Messages can burn the moment they're read, or on a timer you choose. Try the idea here. This demo runs entirely in your browser and sends nothing anywhere.
Turn on JavaScript to try the burn-on-read demo.
Sealed message · burns on read
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The flow
Five steps. Zero knowledge on our end.
Generate keys
Your device creates your identity. Keys never leave it.
Exchange codes
Share a QR code or link. No personal information changes hands.
Send encrypted
Every message is encrypted locally before it's sent.
Delivered and deleted
The server purges each message the instant it's delivered.
Gone
Set a timer or burn on read. Nothing stays.
Deeper cuts
Built for the day it matters
Shipped on Android today. Some of it deliberately has no in-app UI at all. The how-to guide covers every detail.
Second vault
A second passphrase can open a second, fully independent Zitrone, with no button, no wizard and no cryptographic evidence it exists.
Second vault guidePucker Burn
A duress password. Typed at the lock screen, it erases everything Zitrone holds on the device, and the app can't even confirm one is set.
Pucker Burn guideLemon drops
Seal a message into a one-time QR dead drop. Anyone can scan it, only the device it was sealed for can open it, and an unclaimed drop burns on the relay at its deadline.
Lemon drops guideCover traffic
Every real send travels with a same-size cover frame at a randomized offset, so a network observer can't pick out the real one. Real sends are never delayed to make cover.
Network guideWhat the server keeps
A relay, not an archive
Store-and-forward only. A message waits as an opaque encrypted blob until delivery is confirmed, then it's deleted. Undelivered messages are purged after 72 hours.
The complete list it stores
- A random account ID, not a username
- Your public identity key and public prekeys
- Encrypted message envelopes in transit
- Encrypted attachment blobs it can't look up without a token
- Delivery receipts as a hash of the message ID
- Account creation timestamp
What it never stores
- Message content of any kind
- IP addresses
- Device identifiers
- Contact lists
- Read receipts linked to identity
- Identifying logs. Access logs are disabled outright.
No pretending
Honest about the edges
How it connects
- I2P firstOn by default when the I2P app is installed.
- Tor, opt-inRouted through Orbot. Slower, more private than clearnet.
- Clearnet fallbackClearly labeled in the app as exposing your IP address. Messages stay end-to-end encrypted either way.
- No third-party audit yet. Zitrone says so plainly, and publishes a responsible disclosure policy for researchers.
- Some threats are outside any app. A compromised device with a keylogger, or a second camera pointed at the screen, can't be stopped by software.
- Forensics are real. No app can promise "unrecoverable" against a lab holding your unlocked device, so Zitrone minimizes what's left to find instead.
- Cover traffic has limits. Quiet periods aren't disguised, and the relay still sees envelope routing.
AGPL-3.0
We show our work.
The encryption, the relay and the apps are all open source and auditable, and you can self-host the relay. Zitrone is beta software, and a known-limitations list ships with every release.
- AndroidAvailable now · beta
- iOSIn development
- DesktopIn development
- WebIn development